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Abstract
Literary critics’ engagement with copyright law has often emphasized ontological questions about the
relation between idealized texts and their material embodiments. This essay turns toward a different set
of questions—about the role of texts in the communication of knowledge. Developing an alternative
intellectual genealogy of copyright law grounded in the eighteenth-century contest between innatism and
empiricism, I argue that jurists like William Blackstone and poets like Edward Young drew on Locke’s
theories of ideas to articulate a new understanding of writing as uncommunicative expression. Innatists
understood texts as tools that could enable transparent communication through a shared stock of innate
ideas, but by denying the existence of innate ideas empiricists called the possibility of communication
into question. And in their arguments for perpetual copyright protection, eighteenth-century jurists and
pamphleteers pushed empiricism to its extreme, linking literary and economic value to the least
communicative aspects of a text.
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JONATHAN SCOTT ENDERLE , a digital
humanities specialist at the University
of Pennsylvania, is completing a book
manuscript on the epistemology of
literary communication in eighteenthcentury Britain. His recent work focuses
on theoretical foundations of statistical
modeling in the humanities.

HAT IS A TEXT? THAT QUESTION IS FRAUGHT WITH ONTOLOGical uncertainty. Are texts nothing more than their physical
manifestations? Or can we meaningfully speak of texts as
abstractions that transcend the context of their embodiment? Literary scholars and copyright lawyers have generally held diferent
views on these questions. In recent decades, interest in material culture has spurred many literary scholars to identify texts with speciic objects: quires of printed paper bound with fabric, board, and
glue; bundles of handwritten pages tied with twine; or corporeal,
albeit ephemeral, patterns of electrical signals rendered on a screen.
But that approach jars with the doctrines of copyright law, which
imagines texts as intangible, immaterial, and wholly indiferent to
the arbitrary physical bodies—books, manuscripts, or screens—that
serve as their vessels. For that reason many literary scholars since
the 1980s have looked askance at copyright law, even as they have
emphasized its historical signiicance; a view of texts as things that
transcend their contingent material origins is bound to be met with
skepticism by a critical mainstream suspicious of the metaphysics of
presence and grounded in the methods of historical materialism. At
its most skeptical, this mainstream regarded copyright as an ideological imposture, or even as a quasi-religious institution.1
Ontological concerns like these have structured thought about
copyright since the beginnings of the Romantic period. In the late
eighteenth century, an anonymous German bookseller wrote that
“the book is not an ideal object. . . . [I]t is a fabrication made of paper.
. . . [I]t does not contain thoughts; these must arise in the mind of the
comprehending reader. It is a commodity produced for hard cash,”
while Johann Fichte argued to the contrary that a book embodies
an irreducible fragment of its author’s intellect: “each individual has
© 2016 jonathan scott enderle
PMLA 131.2 (2016), published by the Modern Language Association of America
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his own thought processes, his own way of
forming concepts and connecting them. . . .
[N]o one can appropriate his thoughts without thereby altering their form. This latter
thus remains forever his exclusive property”
(qtd. in Woodmansee 443–45). These competing accounts agree that the legitimacy of
copyright depends on the relations we posit
between idealized forms and physical objects.
This way of thinking postdates the rise of
copyright law in England. Fichte’s Romantic,
post-Kantian idealism and the bookseller’s
proto-Marxist materialism were both gestating at least eighty years after the British
Parliament passed the irst copyright law, the
Statute of Anne, in 1710.
his essay outlines an intellectual history
of the beginnings of copyright law unencumbered by these characteristically nineteenthcentury questions about the ontological status
of the material and the ideal, which continue
to shape literary scholarship’s engagement
with copyright. Rather than ask what texts
are, I ask what texts do. Scholars have seen
copyright either as the beginning of a progressive new regime of intellectual property
or as an early symptom of capitalism’s drive
to commoditize ever-more-abstract entities.
Neither of these points of view adequately
characterizes the attitudes of the thinkers and jurists of the eighteenth century. To
gain a clearer picture of the complex and divergent interpretations of copyright law in
eighteenth-century Britain and their impact
on textual production, reproduction, distribution, and reception, critics and scholars need
to shit their attention from ontological questions to epistemological ones. What matters
is not whether there can or ought to be such a
thing as incorporeal property. What matters
are the ways eighteenth-century individuals
conceptualized their own practices as authors
and readers. In some cases jurists and pamphleteers quibbled over ontological questions,
but their quibbles masked deeper divisions,
over knowledge—what it is, where it comes
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from, how it is transferred, and whether it
can ever be truly private. These questions
concerned not what texts were but what they
did—the roles they played in the creation, development, and dissemination of knowledge.
By bracketing ontological concerns in
favor of the epistemological question What
do texts do?, this essay explores an alternative
intellectual genealogy of copyright law that
troubles familiar associations between literary property, textual stability, interpretive
closure, and transcendental authorial presence. The material turn in literary studies
has seemed to repudiate those closely linked
ideas. The material text, subject to contingency and decay, is an irreducibly noisy channel of communication. The literary work it
embodies is not the immutable creation of a
sovereign poetic will; it is the luid product of
multiple collaborators, iltered through a divided poetic consciousness and misprinted on
fragile slips of paper. Copyright relies on the
text’s transcendence, and it is unsettled by the
text’s corporeality. But in eighteenth-century
Britain this neat alignment of categories did
not hold. Many of copyright’s boldest advocates emphasized textual contingency and
instability, while its most stubborn detractors insisted on the ixity and ideality of the
literary work. From the perspective of many
eighteenth-century thinkers, literary property is airmed by an authorial absence, an
indication that the text has failed to serve as a
transparent channel of communication, fully
connecting readers and authors. A history of
copyright that can make sense of this surprising coniguration of concepts could produce
new insights into questions that are driving
current trends in literary thought—questions
about the relation between the phenomenal
and the given and their role in the production
and consumption of communicative matter.
his essay tells such a history, grounded
in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century epistemological debates that pitted innatism
against empiricism. Innatists held the view
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that all individuals share the same intrinsic
ideas from birth, while empiricists believed
that ideas are produced only by experience
and are therefore unique to individuals. he
contest between these positions progressed
from the mid–seventeenth to the end of the
eighteenth century, beginning as a disagreement among philosophers, the most influential of whom were a group of innatists
known as the Cambridge Platonists and the
empiricist John Locke. It then slowly iltered
into the wider public sphere through multiple
channels, ultimately structuring legal discourse in ways that directly inluenced mideighteenth-century copyright debates. hese
latter debates ostensibly concerned the duration of copyright protection; copyright perpetualists argued that copyright protection
should never expire, while their opponents
argued that copyright protection should be
limited in term. But as they progressed, these
debates began to consider questions about
the nature of communication: Can ideas be
held privately? Can they be transferred? If so,
what enables their transmission? And, most
centrally, what do texts do when they communicate knowledge?
As scholars have long recognized, Locke’s
labor theory of property played a prominent
role in these debates. Property, Locke argued,
arises when an individual labors to create
something new, and copyright perpetualists
sought to extend that reasoning from bodily
to mental labor.2 But Locke’s epistemological
theories were far more signiicant to the copyright debate than the labor theory of property,
which could not apply to textual works unless
they were produced by private labor, a claim
that innatists questioned. By rejecting the notion that some ideas are innate and universal,
constituting a shared intellectual commons,
Locke laid the groundwork for a new conception of ideas as private—and of the texts that
expressed them as private property. Not yet
stymied by the idea-expression dichotomy encoded in today’s copyright law, copyright per-
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petualists saw in this Lockean view of ideas
an opportunity to extend copyright protection indeinitely. However, by denying the existence of innate ideas, Locke destabilized the
theories of communication that were implicit
in innatist thought, for if we have no body of
common ideas to draw on, how can we begin
to understand each other?
To demonstrate how defenders of perpetual copyright and their opponents answered
this question, I irst take up the philosophical
discourse around ideas in seventeenth- and
eighteenth- century Britain, examining the
views of the Cambridge Platonists and Locke’s
refutation of their assertions. In doing so, I
show how Locke challenged the dogma that
ideas are universally communicable. I then
analyze Edward Young’s Conjectures on Original Composition to reveal how Young attacks
the same dogma from an innatist perspective.
In the following section I describe the roles
that Locke’s and Young’s positions played in
Tonson v. Collins (1762), the case in which
“the basic shape of the literary-property debate was realized” (Rose, Authors 78); this
case illustrates the multiple ways that jurists
conjoined innatist and empiricist views of literary ideas. I argue that these bodies of evidence show that the rise of modern copyright
law was accompanied by a radical transformation in ideas about communication, which
linked literary and economic value to the
least communicative aspects of a text. Innatists had imagined language as a natural,
transparent extension of human thought, but
eighteenth-century copyright law instead enshrined a way of thinking about what texts do
that foregrounds and privileges the moments
when meaning escapes us, when communication breaks down—moments of interruption
in the smooth functioning of language.
Epistemology and the Intellectual Commons

In 1739 David Hume wrote that “the principle
of innate ideas . . . is now almost universally
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rejected in the learned world” (106). As support for this sweeping claim, he offers one
terse footnote: “See Mr. Locke; chapter of
power.” hat Hume felt he need only invoke
Locke’s name with a vague citation to make
his point suggests a widespread knowledge
of Locke’s argument among Hume’s readers.
However, this knowledge did not result in the
near universal assent that Hume described.
he doctrine of innate ideas remained inluential ater Locke rejected it, especially among
religious thinkers, who oten used variations
on the doctrine to defend the universality of
moral judgments.3 Far from being easily dismissed, innatism persistently posed challenging questions to the philosophers who hoped
to reject it, and it shaped many developments
in eighteenth-century epistemology.
Innatism had experienced a surge of
popularity in the mid–seventeenth century,
especially among religious thinkers, when a
loose group of Cambridge-educated divines
took up various forms of the doctrine as part
of their turn away from Aristotelian scholasticism. hough they drew from a wide range
of philosophical strains, including new developments in the emerging sciences, they all
partook of some variety of neoplatonism, and
among historians of philosophy they are collectively known as the Cambridge Platonists
(Hutton, “Lord Herbert” 20–34). Among the
Cambridge Platonists were Benjamin Whichcote (1609–83), Henry More (1617–87), Ralph
Cudworth (1617–88), John Smith (1618–52),
and Nathanael Culverwel (1619–51), each of
whom formulated some version of innatism
in support of a rational theology. Culverwel
described a “sacred Manuscript . . . writ by
the inger of God himself in the heart of man”
(34); John Smith spoke of “some radical principles of knowledge . . . sunk into the souls
of men” (16), principles that can only be fully
perceived and understood by those who “shut
the eyes of sense, and open that brighter eye
of our understandings, that other eye of the
soul” (19). For Smith and Culverwel, as for
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many other Cambridge Platonists, this innate
rational faculty facilitated the individual pursuit of divine truth, which one might carry
out independent of any worldly authority.
Though their primary concerns were
theological, several of the Cambridge Platonists also constructed sophisticated epistemological theories. Henry More, in An
Antidote against Atheism (1653), laid out a
theory of innate knowledge that drew liberally from Plato. “There is an active and actuall Knowledge in a man,” More wrote, “of
which . . . outward objects are rather the reminders then the irst begetters or implanters” (19–20). To elucidate this claim, he ofers
the following evocative metaphor:
Suppose a skillful Musician fallen asleep in
the ield upon the grasse, during which time
he shall not so much as dream any thing concerning his musicall faculty, so that in one
sense there is no actuall skill or Notion nor
representation of any thing musical in him,
but his friend sitting by him that cannot sing
at all himself, jogs him and awakes him, and
desires him to sing this or the other song,
telling him two or three words of the beginning of the song, [the Musician] presently
. . . sings the whole song upon so slight and
slender intimation: So the Mind of man being jogg’d and awakened by the impulses of
outward objects is stirred up into a more full
and cleare conception of what was but imperfectly hinted to her from externall occasions; and this faculty I venture to call actuall
Knowledge in such a sense as the sleeping
Musicians skill might be called actuall Skill
when he thought nothing of it.
(20–21)

More plays on two meanings of actual: the
first is roughly synonymous with “enacted”
or “manifest” as opposed to “potential” or “latent,” while the second is roughly synonymous
with “active”—in the way that actual sin, as
distinct from original sin, is the product of individual action. he sleeping musician’s skill is
not actual in the irst sense; his mind is empty,
and whatever skills he has are latent and im-
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perceptible. But his skill is actual in the second sense, because it may come into being as
a result of the activity that follows his arousal.
Likewise, innate knowledge is actual
in that it arises through the activity of the
mind ater it has been “jogg’d and awakened”
or “stirred up” by “outward objects.” These
outward objects do not generate knowledge;
they only activate it. To support this claim,
More considers geometric figures such as
circles and triangles, asking how we can have
knowledge of these igures if they do not exist in their perfect form anywhere in nature.
The only possible answer, he concludes, is
that our knowledge of these forms precedes
any experience of nature (22). his argument,
his description of outward objects as the “reminders” of preexisting knowledge, and his
metaphoric account of sleeping knowledge
“jogg’d and awakened” all vividly recall arguments and metaphors found in Plato’s writings—most notably in the Meno, in which
Socrates attempts to demonstrate that “all
learning is but recollection” by walking an
untutored boy through a geometric proof.
By the end of Socrates’s demonstration, the
youth understands the proof and agrees that
it is valid, though Socrates has done nothing
but ask him questions. herefore, Socrates insists, the boy “has had true opinions in him
which have only to be awakened by questioning to become knowledge” (86).
The metaphor of sleeping knowledge
suggests that both More and Plato offered
what historians of philosophy such as John
Yolton have called a dispositional account of
innateness, in which innate ideas are not immediately present to the mind but are rather
part of the mind’s implicit structure, ready
to be called forth by a particular set of circumstances or through some active intellectual process.4 More writes, “I doe not mean
that there is a certain number of Ideas laring and shining to the Animadversive faculty
like so many Torches or Starres in the Firmament to our outward sight, or that there are
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any igures that take their distinct places, &
are legibly writ there like the Red letters or
Astronomical Characters in an Almanack”;
rather, there is “an active sagacity in the Soul,
or quick recollection as it were, whereby
some small business being hinted unto her,
she runs out presently into a more clear and
larger conception” (20). Dispensing with the
naive literalist conception of innatism epitomized by Culverwel’s “sacred Manuscript,”
More turns to the language of hints and recollections, showing that partial, incomplete,
or latent ideas may still be considered innate.5
More’s innatism prefigured a more
sophisticated version defended by Ralph
Cudworth, whose works, especially the posthumous Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality (1731), inf luenced many
eighteenth-century thinkers. he editor of the
treatise, Edward Chandler, wrote a preface
positioning it as an important contribution to
contemporary debates about ethical reasoning and moral certainty (Hutton, Introd. xiv–
xv), and like the work of other Cambridge
Platonists the treatise supported its claims
with an innatist epistemological framework.
However, Cudworth largely discards the metaphoric language of Culverwel, Smith, and
More, opting instead for a somewhat technical vocabulary: the soul possesses, Cudworth
repeats insistently, “an innate cognoscitive
[cognitive] power . . . of raising intelligible
ideas and conceptions of things from within
itself” (75). Cudworth is careful not to use innate to refer to ideas themselves; rather, the
mind actively generates ideas through an
innate power, which it can exercise without
the aid of external stimuli. Cudworth’s formulation thus avoids certain ambiguities that
attend More’s metaphor of the sleeping musician, in which innate ideas must be “jogg’d
and awakened by the impulses of outward
objects” and in which, though they must be
awakened, innate ideas are nonetheless all
but fully formed beforehand, having been
learned at some point in the past. Cudworth’s
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account is therefore both more innatist, in
that external stimuli are not a prerequisite for
the formation of innate ideas, and more dispositional, in that innate ideas do not exist at
all in the mind before it exercises the innate
power that enables their formation.
The works of the Cambridge Platonists
provided crucial fuel for Locke’s epistemological intervention.6 A full quarter of his Essay concerning Human Understanding (1689)
was devoted to a closely argued refutation of
the doctrine of innate ideas, which he summarizes as the “Opinion amongst some Men,
hat there are in the Understanding certain
innate Principles; some primary Notions,
κοιναι εννοιαι [common notions], Characters,
as it were stamped upon the Mind of Man,
which the Soul receives in its very first Being” (48). Locke’s language calls to mind both
Nathanael Culverwel’s “sacred Manuscript”
and the “legibly writ” characters that More
disavows. In other words, Locke is describing a nondispositional version of innatism,
against which he launches a threefold attack.
First, he challenges the “Universal Consent”
argument—that because “certain Principles
[are] universally agreed upon by all Mankind” these principles must be innate (49)—
by pointing out that this argument could only
support innatism if innatists could show that
no other explanation of universal consent is
possible. Second, he insists that this argument
actually defeats innatism, because no example
of universal consent exists; even statements
that we might expect to produce universal
agreement in fact produce disagreement or
confusion in some cases. And third, he draws
a sharp contrast between ideas acquired
by individual pains and labor and ideas acquired through the bounty of nature—a kind
of cognitive commons. In an argument that
recalls his discussion of private property in
the Second Treatise of Government (1689), he
criticizes innatists for claiming that ideas developed through reason are merely part of a
natural bounty. hat claim, he argues, ignores
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the essential contribution of individual labor
to the development of those ideas.
With his inal argument, Locke attempted
to associate innatism with intellectual laziness, but his arguments inadvertently overlapped with those of the Cambridge Platonists
when it came to the notion of dispositions.
Locke’s arguments against nondispositional
innatism were less efective against dispositional innatists like More and Cudworth, who
agreed with Locke that the development of innate knowledge required mental activity—as
More’s “actuall Knowledge” attests. To More
and Cudworth, we are innately disposed to
act in ways that produce particular ideas, but
we may be prevented from doing so. Seeming
to recognize the challenge of dispositional
innatism, Locke claimed that their position
leads to a conceptual collapse: if the ideas that
result from mental labor are innate, then all
possible ideas must be innate. In that case, “all
Propositions that are true, and the Mind is capable ever of assenting to, may be said to be in
the Mind,” writes Locke, and “[s]o the Mind is
[made] of all Truths it ever shall know.” Locke
seems to hope that his readers will ind such
a position counterintuitive, but the strongest
argument Locke can ofer against it is that it
is “a very improper way of speaking; which,
whilst it pretends to assert the contrary, says
nothing different from those, who deny innate Principles” (49–50). Locke ignores the
fact that a dispositional innatist could use the
same line of reasoning against him; Locke’s
own argument also leads, albeit in a different direction, to a conceptual collapse. At this
moment in the Essay, the dispute between innatism and empiricism seems to descend into
a semantic disagreement, and the two epistemological views appear to be substantively
equivalent. heir equivalence would reemerge
in later debates about copyright law.
The remainder of Locke’s essay offers
a detailed account of how ideas arise in the
minds of individuals. Simple ideas, which
are the direct and indivisible products of

131.2

]

experience, combine to form complex ideas,
which Locke further taxonomizes. Locke
also subdivides experience into two “Fountains of Knowledge, from whence all the
Ideas we have . . . do spring” (104), which he
names “Sensation” and “Reflection.” Sensation denotes experience of the physical world
through the senses, while Relection describes
what might be called inward experience—the
perception of one’s own mental processes.
he claim that all ideas arise from either sensation or relection has an important ramiication for any discussion of copyright: ideas
are strictly private, because both our sensory
experiences and our inward experiences are
private. The concept that ideas are private
leads Locke to some startling conclusions
about language, which he hints at early in
his discussion of ideas: “if it should happen
that any two thinking men should really have
diferent ideas, I do not see how they could
discourse or argue one with another” (180).
If language could communicate ideas, there
would be no such bar to discourse, but for
Locke language communicates no ideas at all.
Where does this leave the notion of communication? he concept of innate ideas gave
the Cambridge Platonists a ready-made theory of communication, one that seemed so
straightforward and obvious that they hardly
needed to articulate it (Dawson 619). Innate
ideas expedite the construction of linguistic
infrastructures, giving speaker and writer,
listener and reader access to the same cognitive scafolding. To understand the meaning of a text, readers need only seek within
themselves the ideas under discussion; the
ideas remain the same, no matter in whose
mind they appear. But perhaps this theory of
communication was too strong: if everyone
already has access to exactly the same ideas,
why is communication ever necessary? Keeping in mind Locke’s emphasis on the labor
required to produce ideas, one might argue
that communication is necessary precisely
because some ideas are not innate.
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Conversely, Locke’s theory of communication may have been too weak. His rejection of the universality and innateness of
ideas suggested that communication is not
as straightforward a process as his precursors had assumed, and at times in the Essay
Locke seemed even to doubt the possibility
of communication. He did eventually offer
an account of communication based on universal ideas, but these ideas are universal not
in a necessary but in a practical sense: their
universality is predicated on the assumed
uniformity of human experience and human
physiology. Should parties to a conversation
have diferent ideas, because either their experiences or their physiologies radically differ, that universality fails, and with it any
straightforward attempt to communicate.
hese were central issues for eighteenthcentury copyright law because cases such as
Tonson v. Collins (1762) and Millar v. Taylor
(1769) turned on the question of what a book
communicates from author to reader—and
what a book does not communicate. he term
communicate comes from the Latin communicare, to make common; and to prevail in
court, copyright perpetualists had to argue
for a failure of communication in this sense.
They had to show how the publication of
ideas might not make them common. Locke’s
account of ideas thus appears more congenial
to copyright perpetualism than the Cambridge Platonists’ account does, insofar as it
theorizes the possibility of communicative
failure. By taking a Lockean view of ideas,
copyright perpetualists were able to argue
that the transmission of texts does not entail
the transmission of ideas; far from being unprotectable, as in modern copyright law, ideas
were the inalienable property of their author.
However, Locke’s epistemology was not the
only option copyright perpetualists had. It
was also possible to imagine a version of innatism that entailed a similar communicative failure: the innatism espoused in Edward
Young’s Conjectures on Original Composition.
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Edward Young’s Synthesis
Young’s Conjectures (1759) has oten been regarded as a seminal text in the history of authorship. hrough his writing on originality
and genius, Young influenced the course of
romanticisms in Great Britain and Germany,
and in doing so he strengthened the case for
authorial copyright. As Martha Woodmansee
has argued, ideas popularized by Young’s essay
(which was translated into German the year of
its publication) bolstered a growing demand
for copyright legislation among German authors of the Romantic era (430). Likewise,
Mark Rose inds Young’s thoughts congenial
to the ascent of proprietary authorship in
Great Britain, insofar as they anticipate “the
organic analogy of the romantics” (“Author”
61). But both Rose and Woodmansee associate
Young with copyright law by reading Conjectures as a proto-Romantic text, and their arguments must therefore recontextualize Young’s
essay geographically or temporally. When one
reads Conjectures in the immediate context of
its publication, however, a diferent picture of
Young’s relation to copyright emerges. Forty
years before Wordsworth took up the “organic
analogy” at the heart of Young’s essay, Conjectures read not as a proto-Romantic text but as a
post-Platonic text—a modulated continuation
of ideas that Cudworth and other Cambridge
Platonists had developed and defended a century before. In short, Young was an innatist.
he linchpin of Young’s innatist argument
in Conjectures is another analogy: between
genius and conscience. Conscience denoted
“inward knowledge,” and in the early to mid–
eighteenth century it was at the center of a dispute over the innateness of the faculty of moral
judgment.7 As late as 1744, Jonathan Swit had
insisted that conscience “properly signiies the
Knowledge which a Man hath within himself
of his own Thoughts and Actions” and that
such knowledge is useless for the purposes of
moral judgment unless supplemented by the
study of scripture (24). Swit’s quasi-empirical
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stance here allies him with Locke and puts
him at odds with followers of the Cambridge
Platonists such as Joseph Butler and Anthony
Ashley-Cooper, third earl of Shatesbury, both
of whom viewed conscience as an innate faculty of moral judgment.8 By the time Young
wrote Conjectures, conscience had become
irmly associated with Shatesbury’s and Butler’s antiempirical view, and Young uses the
term accordingly: “With regard to the Moral
world, Conscience, with regard to the Intellectual, Genius, is that God within. Genius can
set us right in Composition, without the Rules
of the Learned; as Conscience sets us right in
Life, without the Laws of the Land” (30–31).
Conscience is “that God within,” fully present
in individuals before they learn institutional
rules and at times perhaps even opposed to
those rules. By characterizing conscience as a
faculty that guides us “without the Laws of the
Land,” Young echoes Shatesbury’s critique of
the claim, made famous by homas Hobbes,
that the state is the only guarantor of individuals’ moral behavior. Conscience, for Young
and Shatesbury, precedes institutions of law;
likewise, Young insists, genius precedes institutions of learning.
In addition to being innatist, Young’s
conception of genius is dispositional. A writer
“may possess dormant, unsuspected abilities,” a fact that “is evident from the sudden
eruption of some men, out of perfect obscurity, into public admiration, on the strong
impulse of some animating occasion; not
more to the world’s great surprize, than their
own.” Genius hides its gits, like More’s sleeping musician, “till awakened by loud calls,
or stung up by striking emergencies.” Until
then, a writer may remain “scarce less ignorant of his own powers, than an Oyster of its
pearl, or a Rock of its diamond” (49–50). Like
his philosophical precursors, Young preempts
any argument that genius must not be innate
because it is not apparent from birth. Genius
need not be visible to be present.
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Elsewhere, though, the difference between Young’s innatism and the innatism of
Shaftesbury and the Cambridge Platonists
becomes more apparent. he Cambridge Platonists had held that innate ideas were also
universal; similarly, Shatesbury insisted that
our “Sense of Right and Wrong” is a “first
Principle in our Constitution & Make” (44),
and he argued that the universality of conscience facilitates a natural process of community formation. But for Young genius is
not universal and does not unite individuals
into a community; genius creates distinctions between them. “Let thy Genius rise,” he
commands, “(if a Genius thou hast)” (53)—
and much of Young’s essay is dedicated to
the problem of discovering whether one has
genius or not. Combined with Young’s dispositionalism, the belief that not all writers
have genius produces a belletristic Calvinism; genius may emerge without prior indication, leaving would-be writers of genius to
constantly seek signs of their place among the
literary elect. “Know Thyself. . . . Dive deep
into thy bosom,” exhorts Young, and “learn
the depth, extent, bias, and full fort of thy
Mind” (53), and if genius is to be found there,
“hyself so reverence as to prefer the native
growth of thy own mind to the richest import
from abroad” (54). But this holds only if one
does indeed have genius: “as nothing is more
easy than to write originally wrong; Originals
are not here recommended, but under the
strong guard of my irst rule—Know thyself ”
(61). Without the support of genius, originality is a handicap, a literary vice.
It is in the context of this stark divide
between literary haves and have-nots that
Young links genius most visibly to property.
he writer of genius who reverences himself,
Young asserts,
will soon ind the world’s reverence to follow
his own. His works will stand distinguished;
his the sole Property of them; which Property alone can confer the noble title of an Au-
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thor; that is, of one who (to speak accurately)
thinks, and composes; while other invaders
of the Press, how voluminous, and learned
soever, (with due respect be it spoken) only
read, and write.
(54)

his passage marks a critical shit from the
universalist innatism of the Cambridge Platonists to an exclusionary innatism—a novel
version of innatism that is uniquely suited to
form the basis of a property claim. One of the
hallmarks of property, as Joseph Yates would
insist a decade later in the milestone copyright case Millar v. Taylor, is that it grants
“sole and exclusive Enjoyment” of an object
(Question 73). But if ideas are both innate and
universally held—even if only potentially—
then such exclusive enjoyment is contrary
to their nature. Young’s theory of genius bypasses this problem, articulating a proprietary Platonism in which some ideas are
indeed exclusively possessed. Anyone can imitate a work of genius, but imitation amounts
to nothing more than a loan: “Learning is
borrowed knowledge,” while, by contrast,
“Genius is knowledge innate, and quite our
own” (36). This incommensurable gap between imitation and creation means that the
“noble title of an Author” is nontransferable,
a fact that Young reiterates through another
organic metaphor: “An Original author is
born of himself, is his own progenitor, and
will probably propagate a numerous ofspring
of Imitators, to eternize his glory; while mulelike Imitators, die without Issue” (68).
Young’s proprietary Platonism stands
in stark opposition to many of Locke’s ideas.
For example, Locke’s critique of innatism as
a product and propagator of intellectual laziness applies to Young’s arguments about
genius just as well as it does to any of the
Cambridge Platonists’ arguments about “actuall Knowledge” or “innate cognoscitive
power.” But despite their diferences, Young
and Locke agree that at least some kinds of
ideas are exclusively held by the mind that
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creates them and are strictly nontransferable—or, one might say, incommunicable. To
be sure, ideas are incommunicable in Young’s
and Locke’s accounts for different reasons;
but both accounts hold out the possibility that
authors retain something when they communicate through a work. hat possibility of retention formed the basis of the property claim
that William Blackstone and his allies made
in the mid-century copyright cases.
Copyright and Communication
In April and May of 1759, the banker and
bookseller Benjamin Collins printed, published, and sold copies of Joseph Addison
and Richard Steele’s Spectator. Collins was
not the copyright holder; Jacob Tonson had
purchased copyright in the work forty-seven
years before. But since the only applicable
copyright law, the Statute of Anne (1710),
protected works for twenty-eight years, Collins could not be prosecuted under it; as far
as the statute was concerned, the work had
entered the public domain. Nonetheless,
Tonson’s heirs, his sons Jacob and Richard,
brought a suit against Collins, claiming that
he had invaded their literary property. The
Tonsons argued that they retained copyright
in the Spectator despite the limited term of
the Statute of Anne: copyright, far from being the temporary consequence of a statutory
monopoly, was literary property in the fullest
sense. Like any other property, they maintained, it was protected in perpetuity by the
common law, independent of any statute, and
was recognized not only by ancient usage but
also by reason and natural right.9
The plaintiffs in Tonson v. Collins were
not the irst to make such an argument, and
the case did not set a lasting precedent; the
Court of King’s Bench refused to consider
it further after finding that the plaintiffs
and defendant were colluding in an effort
to produce a ruling favorable to themselves
and their fellow booksellers in the London
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trade. Nonetheless, the case was historically
significant because it featured two figures
who would later participate in the precedentsetting cases Millar v. Taylor and Donaldson
v. Beckett (1774). William Blackstone, the author of the inluential Commentaries on the
Laws of England (1765), was a counsel for the
plaintifs in Tonson v. Collins and went on to
represent another London bookseller in Millar v. Taylor and to defend literary property
before the House of Lords as one of twelve
advisory judges in Donaldson v. Beckett
(1774). Joseph Yates, the defendant’s counsel
in Tonson v. Collins, would take a place on the
Court of King’s Bench and write the dissenting opinion in Millar v. Taylor, setting forth a
critique of literary property that remains salient ater more than two hundred years.
The case was heard twice, in 1761 and
1762, before the Court of King’s Bench, Lord
Mansfield presiding as chief justice. Alexander Wedderburn argued for the plaintifs
at the irst hearing and attempted to restrict
the property claim of authors to the proits of
publication. his was, he claimed, an incorporeal property right, but only in the sense
that, for example, the right of way across a
tract of land is incorporeal; such incorporeal rights in corporeal entities were by this
time fairly well established in the common
law. “When I speak of the Right of Property,”
declared Wedderburn, “I mean in the Proits
of his Book; not in the Sentiments, Stile, &c”
(Tonson v. Collins [1761] 302). Wedderburn
was hoping to sidestep the argument that sentiment and style are incorporeal, impossible
to possess exclusively, and therefore incapable
of supporting any property right whatsoever.
However, when the case was heard a second
time, in 1762, William Blackstone took Wedderburn’s place and made a much bolder
claim. Not content to sidestep the argument
that sentiment and style are incorporeal and
impossible to possess, Blackstone attacked it
head-on. Quoting Edward hurlow, the barrister who had argued for the defendants
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in 1761, Blackstone insisted that a “‘literary
Composition, as it lies in the Author’s Mind,
before it is substantiated by reducing it into
Writing,’ has the essential Requisites to make
it the Subject of Property” (Tonson v. Collins
[1762] 322).10 Although Blackstone then refers
to Locke’s labor theory of property, the essential foundation of his argument is a Lockean
view of ideas. While a literary composition
lies dormant in the Mind, it is absolutely in the
Power of the Proprietor. He alone is intitled to
the Profits of communicating, or making it
public. he irst Step to which, is cloathing our
conceptions in Words, the only Means to communicate abstracted Ideas. Ideas drawn from
external Objects, may be communicated by
external signs; but Words only, demonstrate
the genuine Operations of the Intellect. (323)

In this passage, the philosophical assumptions that underlie Blackstone’s argument
immediately become clear. His distinction
between “Ideas drawn from external Objects”
and “abstracted Ideas” parallels the dichotomy developed by Locke and widely deployed
in his Essay concerning Human Understanding (1689) to explain how abstractions such as
numbers or geometric forms can arise from
sense impressions. hat parallel alone indicates that Blackstone was drawing not only
from Locke’s political theory but also from
his epistemological theory. More broadly,
this passage shows that Blackstone cannot
be thinking of ideas in an innatist way. he
very notion that ideas in the mind are “absolutely in the Power of the Proprietor” directly
contradicts any theory holding ideas to be
universal and innate. Even if an idea is immediately present in just one mind, the mind of
the so-called proprietor, a dispositional form
of innatism would hold that it is potentially
present in the minds of all others; the “proprietor” could do nothing to prevent any of
them from acquiring it on their own.
For Blackstone, then, ideas are the product of individual experience and mental la-
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bor—that is, sensation and relection in the
Lockean sense—and the right of property in
ideas arises naturally from that fact.11 Blackstone reinforces this line of reasoning with a
subtle shit in diction over the course of his
first argument. Initially, the word he uses
most often to refer to mental equipment is
idea, but as he continues he begins to favor
another term: sentiment. Two paragraphs after asserting that we communicate by “cloathing our conceptions in Words, the only Means
to communicate abstracted Ideas,” he performs a nearly parallel substitution: “Words
are the Vehicle of Sentiments” (323; italics
mine). He then insists that sentiment is the
essence of literary property, stating that “[t]he
Sentiment therefore is the Thing of Value,
from which the Proit must arise” (323–24),
though just a few paragraphs earlier he had
argued that literary property is founded on
“Occupancy in Ideas” (321). Blackstone appears to be using the words idea and sentiment interchangeably, but to treat the two
terms as mere synonyms misses a range of
important distinctions. When one examines
the etymology of the two words, Blackstone’s
shit appears strategic: sentiment is based on
the same Latin root as sense, and in the eighteenth century it was still occasionally used
to refer to sense impressions. In his Enquiry
concerning Human Understanding (1748)
David Hume used inward sentiment and outward sentiment to refer to roughly the same
concepts that Locke had called relection and
sensation, thus associating the term sentiment
with private experience. By contrast, the etymological root of idea is the Ancient Greek
ίδέα, a term Plato had used to denote eternal
forms. Insofar as it was linked to a philosophical tradition claiming that all mental objects
are held in common, idea was a troublesome
word for Blackstone, and he learned quickly
to eschew it. Blackstone’s use of sentiment also
placed him in a complex tradition of thought
that attempted to reconcile theories of universal moral knowledge and judgment with
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Lockean empiricism. It is beyond the scope of
this essay to describe the full semantic range
of the term, but just two years before Blackstone made his argument, Adam Smith had
used sentiment to describe a model of emotional contagion and communicability in his
heory of Moral Sentiments (1759). hat model
depended on the Lockean assumption that
all human beings share certain physical and
mental structures; for Smith, as for Locke,
if that assumption fails, so does communication. Smith’s arguments were influenced
by similar claims made by Hume and Frances Hutcheson, both of whom had reframed
moral judgments as direct experiences by
positing the existence of a “moral sense” subject to the same Lockean assumption (Carey
103). In each of these cases, sentiment signiies a break with innatism by acknowledging
the possibility, however remote, that our ideas
may be radically irreconcilable.
As these complexities illustrate, Blackstone’s account of ideas corresponds closely to
Locke’s, but not perfectly. Blackstone speaks
of ideas being communicated, whereas for
Locke communication may occur, but ideas
are never themselves communicated. We
might assume that when he speaks about
communication Blackstone means just what
Locke does—that is, communication not of
but about ideas—yet this interpretation poses
certain problems for Blackstone’s argument.
Ater all, if communication does occur in the
Lockean sense, then by Locke’s explicit assertion both parties must already have the same
ideas. Even more troublesome for Blackstone’s
argument is the fact that for Lockean communication to occur between readers and an
author, the readers must have come by their
ideas the same way the author did—through
their own mental labor. Why, then, should
the author have any more right to those ideas
than the reader? On the other hand, if no
communication between readers and author
occurs, it is diicult to surmise how a literary
work could have value at all. Clearly Black-
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stone requires a model of communication, or
at least of reading, diferent from anything we
have encountered so far. In fact, Blackstone
hints at such a model in his rebuttal of Yates,
whose counterargument exposes some of the
potential diiculties of Blackstone’s position.
In Tonson v. Collins (1762), Yates founds
his argument against literary property on an
innatist understanding of communication.
He begins by conceding that mental labor
does grant a property right. However, “this,
and every other Kind of Property may be rendered common, by the act of the Proprietor,”
and publication is the act of rendering common one’s mental property: “the Author has
a Property in his Sentiments, till he publishes
them. . . . But from the Moment of Publication, they are thrown into a State of universal
Communion.” Two English cognates of the
Latin communis, common and communion,
foreshadow the direction of Yates’s argument.
He then considers the prerequisites for a
property claim, insisting that an item of property must be capable of “separate and exclusive Enjoyment” and that “actual Possession is
not always necessary, yet potential Possession
is” (333). hough he does not say so explicitly,
Yates implies that incorporeal rights such as
the right of way across land arise from the
possibility of exclusion. Right of way exists, in
short, because it may be enforced or denied by
corporeal means. But this is not so of ideas:
he original MS. is not, nor ever was, in the
Hands of the Defendants. he Books sold are
not, nor ever were, the Property of the Plaintifs. he Paper and Ink belonged to the Defendants. All the Plaintifs can claim is, the Ideas
which the Books communicate. hese, when
published, the World is as fully in Possession
of, as the Author was before. From the moment of Publication, the Author could never
conine them to his own Enjoyment.
(334)

Ater the physical book is sold, nothing corporeal remains for the author or publisher to
lay claim to; and because Yates takes an inna-
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tist view of communication, he insists that the
act of communicating an idea destroys any
possibility of exclusively possessing it. Filling
out Yates’s argument from the perspective of
a dispositional innatist and universalist, we
might say that the author’s ideas were already
potentially in the possession of all readers and
that by publishing them the author actualizes that possession, so that no further legal
distinction can be made between the author’s
possession of the ideas and readers’ possession
of them. Since the author can no longer exercise any form of exclusive possession over the
ideas, they can no longer be subject to property law, which, Yates reiterates, “acts only
upon Subjects, where there is a Possibility of
separate and exclusive Enjoyment” (334).
Yates’s repeated emphasis on “separate
and exclusive Enjoyment” indicates that his
concern with corporeality and incorporeality has more to do with the speciic problem
of exclusion than with a vague metaphysical
qualm about incorporeal property. However,
Blackstone’s rebuttal attacks a straw man,
focusing only on Yates’s discussion of corporeality and entirely neglecting his argument
about exclusion. Indeed, neither Blackstone
nor Yates seemed to fully realize that their
disagreement arose from two dramatically
diferent deinitions of the word idea. However, Blackstone does ofer one analogy that
strikes near the heart of their disagreement.
Disputing Yates’s claim that a published work
is, “like Land thrown into the Highway . . . a
Git to the Public,” Blackstone counters that
publishing a book “is more like making a Way
through a Man’s own private Grounds, which
he may stop at Pleasure; He may give out a
Number of Keys, by publishing a Number of
Copies; but no Man, who receives a Key, has
thereby a Right to forge others, and sell them
to other people” (341). In this analogy, the relations among author, idea, work, and reader
in Blackstone’s view become momentarily
crystallized. According to Locke, ideas are
not held in common but are the inalienable
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property of their creators, having been generated by individual experience and mental
labor. A work is not a collection of its author’s
ideas but rather a key that opens a passage
through its author’s mind, giving readers a
particular kind of access to those ideas. No
ideas ever change hands, but, just as one
might stroll along a fenced path to view the
terrain beyond, readers are able to experience
the author’s ideas and to develop ideas of their
own from that experience. A key is alienable,
but the lands to which it grants access remain
the property of their owner, and it is a breach
of that property to copy the key without permission. Likewise, a work is alienable, but the
ideas it grants access to remain the property
of their creator; therefore one may possess a
work without possessing the right to copy it.
Not only does Blackstone’s analogy clarify these relations, it also hints at a model of
reading that might help Blackstone defend
literary property from a Lockean standpoint;
but this is a model of reading as noncommunication. In this model the value of the work
comes not from the ideas that it communicates but from the experience that it enables
readers to have. Young, too, takes such a view
of literary value: “he mind of a man of Genius is a fertile and pleasant field,” and the
work of genius “opens a back-door . . . into
a delicious Garden of Moral and Intellectual
fruits and lowers; the Key of which is denied
to the rest of mankind” (9, 5). These fruits
and flowers never change hands; the pleasure of observing them is enough. he work
is an “Amusement” and a “Refuge”; through
it the reader is “quieted” and “refreshed” and
takes a “pleasing Pause” (5–6); but does the
work communicate anything? Perhaps so, but
whatever is communicated cannot be passed
on; it is not valuable to anyone but the recipient, who cannot transmit the same experience
on to another. he pleasures of reading a work
of genius simultaneously prove the richness
of genius and the impoverishment of passive
reception, and they leave little possibility for
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intellectual reciprocity. For Young anything
communicable is, at best, mere learning—
“borrowed knowledge” available for loan by
anyone and therefore worth little (36).
If Blackstone’s argument is to be sound,
he must agree with Young on this: for communication to occur, whatever is communicated cannot be literary property—even
from a Lockean perspective on ideas. For if
readers’ ideas are indeed the same as the author’s ideas, as Locke insists is necessary for
communication, and if readers produce them
by their own labor, as the author did before
them, then there remains nothing to be held
as property. At this point, the Lockean model
of communication begins to look similar to
the model of communication implicitly proposed by the Cambridge Platonists. Ideas may
come from experience rather than from an
“innate cognoscitive power,” but they are effectively common property either way, at least
potentially, because otherwise no communication could occur. he equivalence between
innatism and empiricism hinted at in Locke’s
Essay begins to reassert itself here. As long as
Blackstone holds on to the notion of communication, he is caught in a double bind—an
inescapable consequence of the paradox of
communicable property.
Almost eight years after Tonson v. Collins, Yates and Blackstone again defended
opposing positions in the literary-property
debate. This time Yates stood on the other
side of the bar, as one of the four justices in
Millar v. Taylor. However, as the sole dissenter
in the case, he stood alone, having failed to
sway the court against the idea of literary
property. he center of the literary-property
debates shited from the English to the Scottish courts, where an innatist view of ideas
continued to play a role. Hinton v. Donaldson
(1773), the case in Scotland that contradicted
Millar v. Taylor, set the stage for the establishment of the public domain in Donaldson
v. Beckett (1774). In Hinton, Alexander Donaldson’s counsel made a familiar argument:

[

PM L A

Suppose two diferent men compose tables of
interest; if both their calculations are exact,
they must, according to the rules of arithmetic, turn out to be the same. his observation
will apply to most kinds of tables or calculations, as on life-annuities, logarithms, almanacks, &c. If the irst publishers of any such
works were to have a perpetual monopoly, how
absurd would such a position be, and how unjust to the rest of mankind! (Information 19)

In a line of reasoning reminiscent of the arguments that Smith, Culverwel, and Cudworth
had made a century before, Donaldson’s
counsel argued that the universal nature of
mathematical truths—whether our knowledge of them is founded on empirical observations or on innate dispositions—directly
contradicts the logic of literary property. he
possibility of communication is founded on
these truths, and thus if communication is
possible, literary property cannot exist except as a statutory monopoly. There is only
one situation, Donaldson’s counsel argued,
“in which it can be igured that an author retains the exclusive enjoyment of his ideas, after having published them, viz. if he writes in
an unknown language, or character invented
by himself, and which he alone can decypher”
(Information 11). he regime of literary property is a regime of encryption, in which the
reader’s understanding of the text is endlessly
deferred but the possibility of understanding
remains, and in which the proprietary work is
held forever just out of its reader’s grasp.
Incommunicable Things
At the beginning of his argument, Donaldson’s counsel in Hinton v. Donaldson turned
to a question that seemed to involve corporeality. “Property,” he argued, “is deined to
be, jus in re; and there can be no property
without a subject or corpus, to which it refers” (Information 5–6). Like Yates, he proceeded to argue that this is not an arbitrary
restriction; rather, it arises because incorpo-
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real entities cannot be exclusively possessed.
For that reason, the role of corporeality in his
argument is secondary. If we could create an
incorporeal thing that could be possessed by
one person, to the absolute exclusion of all
others, then there could be no objection to
incorporeal property along these lines. But
Donaldson’s counsel dismisses that possibility in his progression from res to corpus. He
began with a deinition of property as jus in
re, right in a thing—a more vaguely deined
entity than the corpus, the body. By slipping
from thing to body, Donaldson’s counsel associated thingness with the possibility of
exclusive possession, while simultaneously
discounting the existence of bodiless things.
However, as I have argued, Locke’s epistemology had introduced the possibility that
ideas might indeed be bodiless things—incorporeal entities that could be possessed exclusively. In this account, ideas are, at their
foundation, mute; they cannot be transferred
or exchanged, and there is no marketplace of
ideas. Locke backs away from this point of
view by arguing that because we have similar
bodies and minds, and because we live in the
same physical world, we must all have similar
ideas; and so even if our ideas themselves refuse to speak, we can talk about them and tell
one another how to re-create them through
sensation and reflection—through experience.12 But copyright perpetualists welcomed
this refusal to speak, making it the basis of
a property claim with respect to texts that,
paradoxically, express ideas without communicating them.
In a diferent kind of essay, I might have
traced through these latter two perspectives a
genealogy of speech and experience—of voice
and phenomenon—to the twentieth century
and into the present day. Both perspectives
are opposed to an innatist point of view that
tries to convince us of the transparency of all
communication—as if by talking to one another we are only talking to ourselves. But together they introduce a new opposition that
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bears some relation to a set of phenomenological concepts articulated by Edmund Husserl in his Logical Investigations (1900). In an
argument crucial to his own project and to
its inluence over later continental philosophy, Husserl distinguishes between two partially overlapping kinds of signs—those that
indicate and those that express. Some signs
merely indicate by associating one thing with
another in a way that is not only noncausal
but also not yet linguistic; others communicate meaning in its fullest sense by both expressing and indicating; and still others only
express, without indicating or communicating anything. As an example of the last kind
of sign, Husserl ofers the soliloquy: “here is
no speech in such cases,” he writes, “nor does
one tell oneself anything” (280). Communication demands telling, and how could we
possibly tell our self-present selves something
we do not already know? Viewed from some
angles, Blackstone’s noncommunicative expression looks much like a Husserlian soliloquy. he copyrighted work takes the guise of
an author’s self-directed speech; an audience
may listen in this case, but the author’s words
have no clear indicative force.
From there, this hypothetical genealogy
might follow Jacques Derrida from his rejection of Husserlian self-presence, in Voice and
Phenomenon (1967), to his later discussion
of “the truth of the copyright and the copyright of the truth” in “Limited Inc a b c . . .”
(1977 [30])—thus returning to the point from
which my discussion began. Derrida might
emerge as a rescuer, who by rejecting Husserlian soliloquy also rejects the dangerous legal
arguments that created, for a brief period,
a legal regime of perpetual copyright.13 But
these subsequent moves risk diverting our
attention from current discussions of phenomenological diversity that give new force
to Blackstone’s reasoning. Recent years have
seen several waves of criticism and theory attentive to communicative disavowal. Speculative realists have reimagined scientific
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enterprise as a struggle to force recalcitrant
things to indicate what they have so far only
expressed in secret; scholars in animal studies have explored the possibility that other
species may inhabit a world of meaning inaccessible to us; and afect theorists have defended the rights of human beings to linger
on the aspects of personal experience that
resist communication and absorption into a
shared horizon of the given. Blackstone’s arguments show us that these ways of thinking
could have proprietary ramiications and that
we must pursue them in a way that balances
our desire for an open society with our defense of a right not to speak.
In yet another kind of essay, I might
have traced a different genealogy, linking
these early ways of thinking about idea and
expression to modern copyright law. In the
twentieth century, it has become an established doctrine in the Anglo-American context that copyright protects not the ideas
but the expression of the ideas in a text. his
doctrine attempts to distinguish imitations
that directly copy specific portions of text,
characters, or plotlines from those that borrow only broad outlines, general archetypes,
or global plot structures. On a cursory view,
the diferent ways of thinking about communication that I’ve discussed might look like
ancestors of this idea-expression dichotomy.
But although there were glimmerings of that
distinction in eighteenth-century court cases,
modern commentators have been too quick
to read those glimmerings as evidence of a
stable and well-theorized dichotomy. When
William Blackstone asserted in Tonson v. Collins that “style and sentiment are the essentials of a literary composition,” his use of style
hints at a modern understanding of copyright
as protected expression. But there are reasons
to doubt that Blackstone is using style in this
modern sense. By describing the process of
composition as “cloathing our conceptions in
Words,” Blackstone echoes lines from Pope’s
“Essay on Criticism” (1711) that emphasized
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not the separability of style and sentiment but
their necessary unity in well-crated writing:
Expression is the Dress of hought, and still
Appears more decent as more suitable
A vile Conceit in pompous Words exprest,
Is like a Clown in regal Purple drest;
For dif’rent Styles with dif’rent Subjects sort,
As several Garbs with Country, Town, and
Court.
(lines 318–23)

For Pope, and perhaps still for Blackstone,
style and sentiment were distinct but closely
linked—not dichotomous. By reading these
moments in Blackstone’s argument as anticipations of modern legal doctrine, we
gloss over much of the texture of eighteenthcentury thought about copyright.
Instead of projecting the present back
onto the past, we might study the beginnings
of copyright to think about ways of relaxing
the rigid legal distinction between idea and
expression—to reconceive that distinction in
terms not only of writing but also of reading,
imagining reading as a mode of expression as
well as a mode of reception—and to see in the
course of development of these ideas alternatives to both the modern copyright regime
and the critical commonplaces that we have
inherited. My approach to the early years of
copyright focuses on the broad range of answers that eighteenth-century thinkers ofered
to the question What do texts do? In natists
emphasized the universality of ideas and conceived of texts as tools of communication that
functioned smoothly and transparently to
link authors to readers; empiricists drew attention to ways those tools broke down, with
the hope of repairing them; and copyright
perpetualists embraced the tools’ breakdown
as a way of turning ideas and the texts that
expressed them into things. For expediency
I have presented these as three competing
points of view, but my intention has not been
to embrace one of them while discarding
the others. Instead, I propose that all three
articulate useful ways of thinking about the
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encounters between author, text, and reader.
For copyright perpetualists, an uncommunicative text speaks to us of foreign experiences
in an alien language; for empiricists, a text
speaks in a half-learned tongue, tantalizing
in its partial coherence; and for innatists, the
text whispers familiarly in our ear, transparent in its meaning and obvious in its intent.
Our paths through these modes of encounter
need not be unidirectional, nor should they
be, since each is latent in the other two. Only
by a long series of turns and returns through
these modes do we learn what texts do.

NOTES
1. E.g., Woodmansee 426, 448 and Rose, Authors 142.
More recently, Greene and Temple have produced work
in this vein. Reform-minded legal historians (e.g., Deazley) have also been inluenced by more-materialist points
of view.
2. Stern outlines the history of the labor theory of
property in Anglo-American copyright law.
3. For examples of such religious thinkers, see Yolton
102.
4. here is some debate about whether the innatism of
Plato’s Meno was indeed dispositional (Rawson).
5. Related views have experienced a resurgence in recent thought about language and cognition (Rogers 203;
Samet and Zaitchik).
6. Among Locke’s other interlocutors were René
Descartes and Edward Stillingleet, bishop of Worcester
(Rickless). Stoicism is sometimes seen as another important strain of innatism to which Locke was responding—
“common notions” was a Stoic concept—but Stoicism
may be interpreted as broadly compatible with Lockean
empiricism (Sellars 74–78).
7. Odell provides a full analysis of Young’s analogy
between genius and conscience.
8. Gill describes Shaftesbury’s indebtedness to the
Cambridge Platonists in detail (71–77).
9. For excellent accounts of Tonson v. Collins see
Deazley 142–47 and Rose, Authors 78–86.
10. his argument contradicts a number of modern
copyright doctrines, including the strict distinction between idea and expression.
11. Locke himself did not support this line of reasoning (Deazley 3–4).
12. Dawson gives a lucid account of Locke’s views on
communication (esp. 627–32).
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13. he precedent set by Millar v. Taylor stood from
1769 to 1774.
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